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Claudia Rosenhan 
(University of St Gallen) 
 “THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY”: ALDOUS HUXLEY’S CRITIQUES OF 
UNIVERSAL EDUCATION 
he aim of this essay is to give a coherent analysis of Aldous Huxley’s 
critiques of universal education with the purpose of reconstructing his 
cultural criticism within its historical context and evaluate its 
usefulness as a contribution to today’s debate on the problems of formal 
education. In order to achieve this aim, my objectives are first of all to classify 
Huxley’s arguments on education and divide them into five categories for 
which education has a particular significance, secondly to illuminate the 
historical, ideological and theoretical background against which Huxley’s 
arguments attain cogency, and finally to present his solutions and assess their 
relevance with respect to current concerns in Western education. I begin with 
education and human nature, since a prevailing theory on human nature 
inevitably determines the prevailing theory on education. 
 
I. Education and Human Nature 
Huxley’s first critique of universal education attacks the prominence it affords 
to nurture over nature, and in his own survey of humankind, Proper Studies, 
he sets out to refute what he calls the “entirely false conception of individual 
human nature,”1 namely the ideology of the “blank slate.”2 It is furthermore 
his contention that modern institutions such as schools have evolved to fit this 
erroneous view. Since he claims that “the only social institutions which will 
work for any length of time are those which are in harmony with individual 
human nature,” he predicts that “institutions which deny the facts of human 
nature either break down more or less violently, or else decay gradually into 
ineffectiveness” (CE, II, 146). In his view this has happened to education. 
Huxley’s critique is rooted in a partisan understanding of human nature that is 
mirrored in some important aspects by Steven Pinker’s recent study The Blank 
Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature. Like Pinker, Huxley felt that the 
denial of human nature is in itself treacherous because it puts too much trust 
in the efficacy of social engineering.
3
  
The conception of the blank slate furthermore leads to two important 
misunderstandings about the human mind, the first concerning egalitarianism. 
Locke declared: “The Difference to be found in the Manners and Abilities of 
T 
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Men, is owing more to their Education than to anything else” (Education, 
137–138).4 Thus education came to be regarded as the central formative 
influence on people and the only viable explanation for existing inequalities 
(see “The Idea of Equality” [1927], CE, II, 155). The Aristotelian postulate 
that men are in essence and originally equal and the Cartesian tenet that 
reason is the same in all men prompted eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
political and social reformers to declare that all members of society have an 
equal capacity to be reasonable and could therefore be educated for a rational 
life. Yet by refusing to acknowledge the Hobbesian “universe of Behemoth 
and Leviathan”5 with its pessimistic view of human nature, reformers like 
Godwin were, according to Huxley, taken in by a false psychology.
6
 He 
claims instead that people react more readily to appeals to their lower passions 
and that “no amount of education or good government will make men 
completely virtuous and reasonable, or abolish their animal instincts” (“The 
Future of the Past” [September 1927], CE, II, 93; see also “On the Charms of 
History and the Future of the Past” [1931], CE, III, 137).  
The second misunderstanding is based on the belief that the Lockean mind 
is uniform in its ability to achieve anything, and Huxley thinks that this 
behaviourist theory exercises a “baneful influence on current systems of 
education”, first by regarding the mind as a box into which ideas can be 
introduced with impunity and second by treating all minds as identical 
(“Education” [1927], CE, II, 194, 197–198; see also “The Idea of Equality” 
[1927], CE, II, 155). The, in Bantock’s words, “uniformitarian tendencies”7 of 
nineteenth-century reform were a logical reaction to the unregulated, 
haphazard and fairly rudimentary educational system in existence at that time, 
because only by believing in the homogeneity of human ability could a 
standardised system succeed.
8
 But for the future Huxley hopes that such a 
reductive science of mental processes is replaced by a new “psychological 
realism” in education (“The Outlook for American Culture: Some Reflections 
in a Machine Age” [August 1927], CE, III, 193), by which he proposes 
“simply applied psychology, applied heredity and applied psycho-physiology” 
(“Education” [21 December 1932], CE, III, 350). 
First steps to diverge from uniform standards were taken in the 1920s. IQ 
testing
9
 as a regulative measure to override the still existing class bias in 
education, or IQ-elitism, as Gordon and White call it, was an attempt to 
realise a meritocracy, a Platonic denial of class-bound intelligence and 
ability.
10
 Another approach was to classify the mind into three categories, 
abstract, mechanical and concrete, for which a tripartite system of grammar, 
secondary modern and technical schools was devised.
11
 However, the link 
between meritocracy, IQ testing and social success is not self-evident. It 
implies that the “technocratic-meritocratic ideology” is inherently egalitarian 
and that social success is solely based on technical and cognitive skills.
12
 Even 
though access to grammar schools was thereby eased for lower classes, 
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Gordon shows how the provision of scholarships to disadvantaged children 
and the extension of selection principles did not counteract the demands of the 
11+ examination in which social factors still played an important role.
13
 
Huxley’s view of IQ testing and tripartism is similarly negative. He believes 
first of all that the mind, “hereditary make-up and acquired attainments”, is an 
organic whole whose constituent parts cannot be isolated in this way 
(“Varieties of Intelligence” [1927], CE, II, 181). He also realises that 
educational provisions were in effect based on status and income, not ability: 
“Class and money determine not the nature of the individual’s intelligence but 
the way in which it shall be used and the ends which the individual sets 
himself to attain” (192).  
Huxley concedes that universal education is by necessity democratic and 
standardised, but that even standardised education should provide for people 
the opportunity to benefit individually from it. His favoured educational 
strategy was the Dalton Plan, by which children with individual talents, 
abilities and aptitudes control their own learning process in an environment 
geared towards mutual support and cooperation (“How Should Men Be 
Educated?” [December 1926], CE, II, 75).14 The Dalton system addresses all 
the problems Huxley identified with universal education. It takes individual 
human nature for granted and does not believe in mechanistic teaching 
methods that treat the mind as a uniform receptacle. He blames the failure to 
adopt Daltonised schools as a standard educational provision on the endurance 
of Lockean and Helvetian doctrines, the “blank page of pure potentiality […] 
capable of being molded by education into any desired form” (“Where Do 
You Live?” [1956], CE, V, 175). It remained his lifelong conviction that 
Helvétius’s De L’ésprit is a preposterous book and that Watson’s and 
Skinner’s work was tainted by their oversimplification of human nature. 
Huxley fears that in order to solve the conundrum of universal education, 
governments might go further than just pretend that every child has the same 
intellectual potential. In the grip of a totalitarian doctrine, social engineering 
leads to a Brave New World instead of a democratic utopia (Brave New World 
Revisited [1958], CE, VI, 279 – 286).  
 
II. Education and Social Control 
The excessive “uniformitarianism” of the Brave New World may be a 
dystopian vision, but throughout the nineteenth century the “blank slate” was 
commandeered to prove the efficiency of education in controlling required 
outcomes and initiate fundamental social and political changes. Working-class 
and middle-class educators each attempted to assume control over popular 
education, yet this class-struggle reinforced the instrumental function of 
education as a means of social control rather than social change. Andy Green 
illustrates in Education and State Formation: The Rise of Education Systems 
in England, France and the USA how the monitorial system set the 
ALDOUS HUXLEY: MAN OF LETTERS 4 
institutionalised parameters of universal education by enforcing industrial and 
capitalist values like punctuality, obedience and discipline.
15
 When the state 
finally took over the provision of popular education at the end of the century, 
it put similar emphasis on the non-cognitive values of discipline and authority, 
thus transforming education into a political acculturation to the values of a 
dominant class. In “Nationalizing Education” (1916) Dewey asserts how 
exploiting it for such ends undermines the democratic claim of education and 
helps “refeudalizing” the system.16  
This charge is not new. Universal education as a means for social control 
had previously been criticised by the philosophical radicals. J. S. Mill 
commented: “A general State education is a mere contrivance for moulding 
people to be exactly like one another; and as the mould in which it casts them 
is that which pleases the predominant power in the government […] it 
establishes a despotism over the mind.”17 Mill’s estimation feeds into 
Huxley’s investigation into the nature of ideals, Ends and Means, in which he 
identifies what lies at the bottom of the contemporary crisis in education, 
namely that the “strict authoritarian discipline of state schools” emphasises 
values which primarily benefit a hierarchical and militaristic social 
organisation. In Huxley’s opinion it is therefore no wonder that the “decline 
of democracy has coincided exactly with the rise to manhood and political 
power of the second generation of the compulsorily educated proletariat” 
(“Education” [1937], CE, IV, 269 – 270). In this light “universal education 
has proved to be the state’s most effective instrument of universal 
regimentation and militarization, and has exposed millions, hitherto immune, 
to the influence of organized lying and the allurements of incessant, imbecile, 
and debasing distractions” (“Politics and Religion” [1941], CE, V, 12). Only a 
ruling oligarchy benefits from the social engineering education provides, be it 
in the form of an uncritical mass-consumerist population or an army of 
specialized stooges for political ends (Science, Liberty and Peace [1946], CE, 
V, 273 – 274). Huxley’s warning of universal education resulting effectively 
in the decline of democracy comes after it had earlier become reality in Italy 
and Germany. 
However, the dream of positive social engineering was not yet dead at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Progressives like Dewey still regarded 
education as a countermeasure to the authoritarian bias in popular education 
and still believed in it as “the fundamental method of social progress and 
reform” (“My Pedagogic Creed” [1897], Dewey, 234), if only the syllabus and 
the methodology emphasises freedom and responsibility enough. Yet Huxley 
is sceptical that “any great scheme of human regeneration,” be it religious, 
economical or political, could be achieved through education, simply because 
history has shown how these intentions were habitually reverted to the 
opposite. A “religious faith in the efficacy of education” has by the end of the 
1920s not succeeded in abolishing the Edwardian stratified society (“The New 
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Salvation” [September 1929], CE, III, 212 – 213), because, in Bernstein’s 
words, “education cannot compensate for society”.18  
The reason that radicals and socialists initially lobbied against state 
education was not only because they feared its abuse as a means of social and 
political control by the government, but, as Alan Richardson shows, they were 
also suspicious of the knowledges and methodologies that such an education 
system perpetuates, such as overtly imperialist, capitalist and nationalist 
doctrines.
19
 A. V. Kelly asserts that these knowledges are often treated as 
positivistic facts, decontextualised and compartmentalised in order to be 
transmissible by the teacher and passively absorbable by the students.
20
 Yet 
Huxley exposes such “reasonable” world-views we obediently accept as 
“metaphysical entities” (“Varieties of Intelligence” [1927], CE, II, 191) based 
upon cultural preferences (“No Disputing About Reasons” [May 1927], CE, 
III, 143 – 144). He criticises that “we are taught in terms of rigid formulas, we 
are made to believe dogmatically that only one thing can be true or right at 
one time and that contradictions are mutually exclusive” (“Some American 
Contradictions” [October 1929], CE, III, 213). His criticism thus anticipates 
the postmodern crisis of epistemology which in Kelly’s definition regards 
“knowledge as a social, even a personal construct”, an ideological device for 
the maintenance and exercise of power (63).  
Stripped of any supreme claim to truth, knowledge is thus not only 
ideologically determined but also hierarchical. The ability to project its own 
convictions onto others which then becomes the “natural” way of seeing the 
world is what Antonio Gramsci termed the hegemonic power of the dominant 
social group.
21
 The definition of cultural capital transferred via education 
represents such a moral-intellectual leadership and it is, as Pierre Bourdieu in 
“Cultural Reproduction and Social Reproduction” has shown, only valuable to 
those who, by descent and privilege, already own it.
22
 The education system 
reproduces cultural and social values and exercises hegemonic control over 
those who do not own cultural capital and is thereby again closely linked to 
social control and discipline.
23
 Post World War II attempts to level out this 
hierarchy and elevate popular “lowbrow” disciplines to the same status as 
traditional “highbrow” subjects are in Huxley’s eyes equally misguided. 
Pandering to a culture-free concept of knowledge, the resultant “anarchy of 
values” merely leads to “conformity to current conventions of personal and 
collective behaviour” (“Knowledge and Understanding” [1956], CE, V, 213). 
Yet he concedes that the perennial values of a highbrow curriculum are not 
always relevant to contemporary life and should therefore be adapted to match 
the realities of the modern world (215 – 216). 
Huxley feels that what is generally termed the “essentialist” approach to 
education places too much emphasis on remote and externally imposed 
learning objectives.
24
 This entails conserving and transmitting a common 
conservative culture and does not initiate independent inquiry. Teaching is 
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based on rigour and achievement and passing exams is as important as 
discipline. In contrast Huxley puts forward a disinterested model of moral 
education based on the non-attached individual. This model emphasises 
personal autonomy and can e.g. be projected via the “bovaristic” quality of 
literature that offers models for judicious analysis of society (“Bovarism” [27 
May 1933], CE, III, 362 – 364). By building “up in the minds of their charges 
a habit of resistance to suggestion” teachers instil in children the necessity to 
rely on their own resources and resist external stimulation (“Education” 
[1937], CE, IV, 288 – 290), thereby underpinning the democratic freedom to 
question loyalties.  
 
III. Education for National Efficiency 
Yet education is often perceived not as instruction for life but training for a 
livelihood. Huxley’s third critique of universal education condemns its 
utilitarian emphasis on human capital and the economic value of skills. 
National efficiency, a highly prized function of education at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, was impeded by what adherents to the “two cultures” 
controversy called the breakdown in communication between the arts and the 
sciences. It fuelled the “declinist” view of economic history that a humanistic 
prejudice in education left Britain without properly trained specialists and 
workers. By refuting that the measure of man is only his “socially valuable 
abilities” (“Education” [1927], CE, II, 216), Huxley is an outspoken critic of 
the increasingly specialised “second heroic age of industrialisation” at the 
beginning of the twentieth century (“Abroad in England” [May 1931], CE, III, 
271 and “On the Charms of History and the Future of the Past” [1931], CE, 
III, 135). He asserts: “The worship of success and efficiency constitutes [a] 
menace to our world” (“Spinoza’s Worm” [1929], CE, II, 330),25 a 
premonition of the technocratic nightmare of World War II. Huxley’s 
criticism of students entering “the world, highly expert in their particular job, 
but knowing very little about anything else and having no integrating 
principle in terms of which they can arrange and give significance to such 
knowledge as they may subsequently acquire” (“Education” [1937], CE, IV, 
276) prepared the ground for the war-mongering machinery. 
Still, educating a skilled and specialised workforce was the primary aim of 
nineteenth-century utilitarian education, and a second was projected social 
mobility for the lower classes.
 26
 But basic literacy and the diffusion of “useful 
knowledge” did not have the desired effect since, well into the twentieth 
century, only a tiny minority could climb the ladder of opportunity and attend 
the necessary secondary schools.
27
 It was not until the late 1930s that attempts 
were made to re-fashion the education system on one based on “parity of 
esteem”, which afforded technical education the same social kudos as 
grammar school education. But the quick demise of technical schools as the 
third column of tripartism in the 1940s soon minimised the choices for the 
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lower and middle classes again. The paucity of technical schools and the low 
esteem in which scientific and technical education was allegedly held in 
England, was, according to Wiener, based on the gentrification of the 
nineteenth-century middle classes, which were in his eyes reluctant to support 
a more efficient and vocational education system. In fact, the middle-class 
mandate for more vocational training was fulfilled when e.g. the home and 
imperial civil services began to recruit on a meritocratic system of 
competitive exams and instruction at grammar schools became more 
academically rigorous after 1870.
28
 This progression from patronage to merit 
actually imposed what Harold Perkin called the “entrepreneurial ideal” on 
secondary and higher education.
29
 At first glance it looks as if Huxley 
confirms Wiener’s prejudice of an inherently anti-modern culture at public 
schools and universities when he concedes that these institutions were often 
nothing more than a “delightful social club” (“Education” [1927], CE, II, 
214). Furthermore he agrees that the liberal ideal is not one that should be 
elevated to a universal ideal.
30
 Yet his critique must be located within the 
revisionist school to the Wienerian thesis.
31
  
In contrast to Wiener, Huxley does not see the liberal ideal winning out 
against the vocational. On the contrary, he believes that a humanistic 
education is under attack by technocrats and that more students go to 
universities because the pragmatics of the job market demands it (“Literature 
and Examinations” [1936], CE, VI, 62), despite Huxley’s contention that a 
liberal education cannot lead to social success for the many (“Foreheads 
Villainous Low” [1931], CE, III, 248). In turn, university subjects in the 
humanities were taught according to scientific standards, even though “the 
scientific student of literature is one of the most comical figures of our day” 
(“Education” [1927], CE, II, 215). Huxley maintains his position also in post-
war times by emphasising that humanities “do not lend themselves to being 
taught with an eye to future examinations and the accumulation of credits” 
(“Censorship and Spoken Literature” [October 1955], CE, V, 323).32 
Thus by the 1930s scientific methodology and the emphasis on 
quantifiable outcomes were winning out against a culture of disinterested, 
“useless” knowledge. In Huxley’s eyes, technical and vocational education 
threatened to overwhelm a more eclectic liberal syllabus and narrow the 
horizons of those it educated to a point of absolute specialisation which, as 
mentioned above, ultimately led to the technocratic nightmare of World War 
II. In order to avoid a recurrence of this dangerous one-sided barbarism,
33
 he 
advocated the integration of scientific and emotional truths for which the 
study of literature is again a valuable foundation. First, it has practical value. 
Students learn how to express themselves in writing and speech and evaluate 
the opinions of others (“Literature and Examinations” [1936], CE, VI, 59 – 
62).
34
  In addition, its immediate and moral point of view can mingle with the 
objective point of view of science in order to address fundamental questions 
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about human nature, truth and social harmony.
35
 Huxley’s answer to the “two 
cultures” debate is thus one that integrates what he calls Snow’s “bland 
scientism” and Leavis’ “moralistic literarism” (Literature and Science [1963], 
CE, VI, 90 – 91).36   
 
IV. Education and Cultural Degeneration 
So it seems as if literature was the ideal subject for an integrated and 
disinterested education, though Huxley’s fourth critique of universal 
education shows how literacy was a double-edged weapon in the fight for 
social improvement and acculturation. On the one hand, book reading is 
traditionally the tool for self-improvement and, as an heir to the Arnoldian 
tradition, Huxley feels that “culture is not derived from the reading of 
books—but from thorough and intensive reading of good books” (“Reading, 
the New Vice” [August 1930], CE, III, 48 – 50).37 On the other hand, lower 
class literacy after the French Revolution was regarded as subversive, so that 
the dominant social powers strove to control the reading material of the newly 
literates, a process Harvey J. Graff calls “recreating cultural hegemony”.38 
Richardson similarly illuminates how, as soon as it was realised that a 
substantial number of the populace could spell, political, religious and 
utilitarian groups vied for the attention of the reading public with useful, 
spiritual or improving literature in order to contain any seditious thoughts that 
may result from the “unfettered” literacy of the lower orders (Richardson, 
44).
39
  This inhibited the development of a confident literary and cultural taste 
amongst the lower classes and resulted, according to Huxley, in an inverted 
snobbery. 
Now as then, the hierarchy of cultural capital posits a literate culture at the 
top, controlled, according to Graff’s “literacy myth”, by the middle classes 
(1987, 335). For the lower classes, imperfect reading skills and the lack of 
opportunity made it difficult for them to cross this cultural divide. Instead, 
their culture was dictated to them by the dross and trivia of popular mass 
publications particularly at the beginning of the twentieth century, and they 
were regarded as particularly hapless in their choice of reading matter.
40
 Even 
though Jonathan Rose has recently denied this thesis,
41
 Huxley judges the 
keenness of barely literate workers to access the nation’s cultural capital 
rather more pessimistically. Commenting in 1934 on the newly literate 
Mexican Indians, whose situation in many ways mirrors that of nineteenth-
century British workers, he underlines that a love for reading cannot make up 
for a lack of understanding (Beyond the Mexique Bay [1934], CE, III, 578, 
602).  
This combination of untutored literacy with an intrinsic debased taste is 
held responsible for the perceived cultural degeneration of the early twentieth 
century. Although virtually all popular reading matter was derided as 
sensationalist and culturally impoverished, it provided for many the only 
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chance to own their reading skills without feeling inferior.
42
 In any case, 
functional literacy was applied to activities of which book reading accounted 
for only a small percentage.
43
 Most workers, as Mitch similarly illustrates, 
preferred the Sunday papers and sports journals (60 – 1). Despite the fact that 
leisure seemed to be the main incentive to acquire literacy (Mitch, 78), 
reading was for pleasure rather than improvement.
44
 In light of this, Huxley 
punctures the utopian dream of unlimited leisure leading to enlightenment and 
disinterested scholarly activity, as people would not in general devote 
themselves willingly to a “rational existence” (“Work and Leisure” [1925], 
CE, I, 416). Simultaneously he understands how literacy does not necessarily 
present the cultural pinnacle. Prompted by his interest in mysticism, he 
commended the staple of modern mass entertainment, the radio and the 
gramophone, as a didactic tool,
 45
 modelled on the old traditions of an oral and 
auditory culture.
46
 But by then a hegemonic literary culture had largely 
destroyed the old oral traditions, and the common sensibilities of the people, 
fed on a “peculiarly shoddy kind of sensational and sentimental trash” 
(“Paper” [5 February 1932], Hearst, 318 – 19), were twisted into nationalistic 
and militaristic doctrines. 
Thus the philanthropic dream of an enlightened rational existence for the 
masses is limited by, what Huxley terms, the ‘law of diminishing returns’ 
(“Work and Leisure” [1925], CE, I, 415; see also “Boundaries of Utopia” 
[1931], CE, III, 127). It puts Mill’s dream of a “reign of reason and 
democracy” based on universal literacy out of reach (Science, Liberty and 
Peace [1946], CE, V, 254 and “Propaganda in a Democratic Society” [1958], 
CE,  VI, 242 – 243). Even though literacy enables us to understand our place 
in our culture, culture can also be “a negative force, a something which 
prevents persons, living in certain places and at certain times, from being able 
to think certain thoughts or adopt certain styles of expression” (“Variations on 
a Philosopher” [1950], CE, V, 97). Huxley says: “If we want to understand, 
we must uproot ourselves from our culture, by-pass language” and generally 
leave behind all emotional links to the world. But knowledge is often rooted 
in an unhealthy and “almost maniacal over-valuation of words” (“Knowledge 
and Understanding” [1956], CE, V, 219). So as a remedy for the failings in 
universal education, the overspecialization of technocrats, the indoctrination 
of the populace and the degeneration of culture, education must include 
thorough linguistic training.  
 
V. Language and Critical Thinking 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, language itself had become the 
focus of investigation. The paradigmatic change came with Saussure’s 
structuralist approach that severed the study of language from mainly 
philological concerns and created a system in which the signifier and the 
signified interact to create meaning devoid of reference to an objective 
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material reality. Another strand of linguistic theory emerging in the early 
twentieth century was that of relativism, emphasising the power of language 
to manipulate, constrain or even render incapable the understanding of a 
particular reality if language does not provide for it. The binary bind between 
language and thought is sometimes judged to be so strong by cognitive 
scientists that, as Mark Turner explains, “speech and writing could be ways 
for the brain of one person to exert biological influence upon the brain of 
another person”.47 In other words, language can physically change the way 
people are able to think. Huxley similarly believes that the self-sufficiency 
and separateness of the Western alphabet conditions thought processes. Thus 
he views the invention of the alphabet not only humanity’s highest 
achievement, but also its most dangerous weapon (“Adonis and the Alphabet” 
[1956], CE, V, 235 – 239). The view that language can only give an 
inadequate and conventional view of reality and that it is riddled with 
ambiguity and vagueness, was influential in what has been termed the 
“linguistic turn” in philosophy.48 Huxley’s musings on the nature and 
importance of language and thought are thus crypto-linguistic inquiries into 
the workings of language in an ideological context, emphasising its power to 
manipulate the understanding of a particular reality. He regards language as a 
vague system bearing no relationship to an unknowable reality, even though 
our being is determined by words. He feels that education unfortunately puts 
too much significance on the importance of words and the resulting 
verbalized, abstract knowledge is therefore only a kind of pseudo-knowledge. 
(“Can We Be Well-Educated?” [December 1956], CE, VI, 206) and “The 
Education of an Amphibian” [1956], CE, V, 199). “As we believe, so we are. 
And what we believe depends on what we have been taught”.49 The first step 
to thorough understanding, Huxley advises, is to become more knowledgeable 
about the linguistic reality that surrounds us.  
Today, Critical Language Study underlines the “significance of language 
in the production, maintenance, and change of social relations of power”.50 
This methodology uses the strategies of discourse analysis to investigate the 
expression and reproduction of social identities and social power relations. 
Norman Fairclough quotes Michel Foucault: “Any system of education is a 
political way of maintaining or modifying the appropriation of discourses, 
along with the knowledges and powers which they carry” (65). He puts 
forward a model in which language and discourse are described, interpreted 
and explained, so as to raise awareness of the social operation of linguistic 
features. His model aims to facilitate emancipation not only in newly literate 
societies (which is the main focus of Paolo Freire’s path breaking project in 
Brazil) but also in developed countries like Britain. I propose that Huxley may 
have had a similar model in mind when he criticised the dangerous distortions 
of meaning which language underwent in the late 1930s. Huxley claims that 
“all propaganda directed against an opposing group has but one aim: to 
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substitute diabolical abstractions for concrete persons” (“Words and 
Behaviour” [1936], CE, IV, 57 – 8). In reference to Hartley, Huxley feels that 
the most important part of language teaching is the art of dissociating ideas. 
But “that the art of dissociation will ever be taught in schools under direct 
state control is, of course, almost infinitely improbable” (“Education” [1937], 
CE, IV, 292 and “Education for Freedom” [1958], CE, VI, 284 – 285). 
Huxley’s concerns were in unison with those of other cultural critics. 
Orwell famously stated: “Political language […] is designed to make lies 
sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity 
to pure wind” (“Politics and the English Language” [1946]).51 The ideological 
distortion of language has furthermore been examined by Mikhail Bakhtin and 
his model of the dialogic nature of understanding has been tremendously 
influential for postmodern theory.
52
 He states: “The very same thing that 
makes the ideological sign vital and mutable is also, however, that which 
makes it a refracting and distorting medium” (Bakhtin, 55). In The Dialogic 
Imagination he makes clear that “language is not a neutral medium that passes 
freely and easily into private property of the speaker’s intentions; it is 
populated—overpopulated—with the intentions of others” (Bakhtin, 77). 
Although it is unlikely that Huxley was familiar with Bakhtin, the Russian 
usefully augments Huxley’s link between language, social interaction and 
political consciousness, even though the Marxist view of relations between 
human consciousness and the material world should be opposed by Huxley as 
an advocate of human nature. Yet this assumed discrepancy could be resolved 
if we bear in mind that unawareness and lack of self-knowledge was, 
according to Huxley, one of the major weaknesses of modern civilization. 
Language can be decoded if people were made able to tap into their innate 
abilities, something akin to Pinker’s “language instinct”.  
Teaching the “capacity for autonomous thinking and decision-making”, 
which A. V. Kelly defines as the basis of democratic education (112) was for 
many educationalists epitomised by the classical syllabus of the grammar 
school.
53
 Yet the way Classics were taught, as passive absorption of 
knowledge through rote learning, made it ineffectual in producing real 
understanding. At grammar schools, for instance, most students would sweat 
over Latin and Greek translations without really understanding the content, a 
fact on which Huxley has often remarked (see e.g. “Doodles in the 
Dictionary” [1956], CE, V, 429). What is more, critical thought and self-
knowledge, which Huxley regards as an important educational goal (“Ethics” 
[1937], CE, IV, 401), cannot be assessed in standardised exams. Huxley 
himself submitted The Perennial Philosophy in 1946 as an educational reader 
for people who want to attain total awareness, but feels it is important to 
provide alternative ways of achieving an understanding that “comes when we 
are totally aware” (“Knowledge and Understanding” [1956], CE, VI, 225). 
For those who cannot derive any benefit from a liberal education Huxley 
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advocates non-verbal education as a way to understanding and self-
knowledge.  
Huxley was an enthusiastic supporter of the Dalton Plan, because it made 
the learning experience relevant to the life experience of the child (“How 
Should Men Be Educated?” [December 1926], CE, II, 75). It presents a shift 
in emphasis from what is learned to how the learning process is handled 
(“Education” [1927], CE, II, 212 – 30). Physical activity is an important 
aspect of it, and Huxley, like Dewey, is a keen supporter of F. M. Alexander’s 
kinesthetic training (“How to Improve the World” [December 1936], CE, IV, 
139 – 140). Yet for Huxley Dewey’s learning-by-doing approach does not go 
far enough, because the ideal non-verbal education must also cater for the 
“not-selves”, our spiritual and vegetative soul. (“The Education of an 
Amphibian” [1956], CE, V, 197 – 208). He furthermore speculates that mind-
enhancing drugs in connection with a superior kind of education will have 
revolutionary results,
54
 because drugs “potentiate the non-verbal education of 
adolescents and […] remind adults that the real world is very different from 
the misshapen universe they have created for themselves by means of their 
culture-conditioned prejudices” (Article in Playboy [November 1963], 
Moksha, xix). In “Education on the Nonverbal Level” Huxley lists a whole 
range of (unlikely) subjects that should be taught at school to aid awareness, 
such as yoga, meditation and Tantrik exercises and Gestalt therapy. 
Techniques for elementary pain control (autosuggestion, hypnosis) and ethical 
training and auto-conditioning also potentially generate self-awareness 
([1963], CE, VI, 311 – 316). 
 
VI. The End(s) of Education 
As a supporter of the progressive child-centred approach which, despite 
several attempts, never seemed to get a foothold in the traditional British 
education system,
55
 Huxley has a jaded view of education as a means of 
perfection. He insists that education must address the individual differences of 
human beings in order to be effective—differences that include varied levels 
of ability and intelligence. In addition, he questions not only the means of 
education but also its ends. Many educational activists declare that only an 
educated person can make a valuable contribution to society,
56
 but this 
humanistic objective has resulted in indoctrination for political ends and 
specialisation for economic gains. So Huxley’s critiques of universal 
education overlap with his cultural criticism, because he is not blind to the 
fact that formal education can influence the future of human society. His 
hopes are for a future in which next generations would grow up impervious to 
political propaganda, advertising and religious indoctrination, fortified by a 
balanced and integrated education and instruction how to attain self-
awareness and understanding. This could not be accomplished by the 
standardised, authoritarian and specialised system that emerged at the 
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beginning of the twentieth century. Yet Huxley is also aware that social 
experiments cannot be conducted under laboratory conditions. In 1933 Huxley 
presciently averred that “whenever new educational methods are introduced, 
we can only watch and wait how the experiment will unfold” (“Discipline” [8 
August 1933], Hearst, 370 – 371), a statement he repeated in 1956 (“Can We 
Be Well-Educated?” [December 1956], CE, VI, 203). Today we are now in 
the position to judge tentatively if universal education has proved to be a 
successful experiment or if Huxley’s arguments still have some validity. In 
any case, the continuing debate about education signifies that concerns about 
the ends of education have not yet been satisfactorily resolved. 
Looking back on Huxley’s suggestions, first of all his call for a non-
competitive, individual education, we can see that the actual implementation 
of the comprehensive system in the early 1970s with the aim of abolishing 
selection and providing for children of all abilities may have been a step into 
the direction Huxley favoured. Yet today the current trend is again towards 
more selection under the cloak of diversity and choice. The inevitable result is 
segregation on mainly social factors, determined by parents’ buying powers in 
desirable catchment areas. Comprehensive schools were also the first 
institutions attempting to change instead of reproduce the existing inequalities 
in society. Today, education has the status of a human right whose provision 
cannot depend on a return for society in terms of useful skills and manpower, 
even though A. V. Kelly reiterates how most governments would nevertheless 
treat it as an investment in the economic and political future of the state and 
its members (107, 119, 124). Joel Spring’s exploration of Article 26 of the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights also exposes that education is 
continually and habitually misused for political and religious indoctrination.
57
 
Thus the hold of the government over those it educates has actually increased. 
The National Curriculum, introduced in 1988, specifies what children must 
study and what they are expected to know at certain key stages. This does not 
leave much room for the cultivation of critical faculties. Even the introduction 
of “Citizenship” as a foundation subject in 2002, with a mission statement 
highlighting “knowledge and understanding” is imposed by the state and 
cannot therefore count as a step towards Huxley’s call for “disinterested” 
education. 
The National Curriculum is also based on an extensive system of tests at 
every key stage to check whether children are meeting the pre-set targets. Test 
results, league tables and the need to quantify educational outcomes is not in 
any real sense a way to encourage children to learn at their own pace and in a 
cooperative environment. Furthermore, parcelling knowledge up into 
disparate disciplines works against a system of integrated education. 28 years 
after Lord Callaghan’s Ruskin Speech, the current government continues to 
uphold that education must profit society in terms of a competitive national 
economy, for which the term “knowledge economy” has been coined. The 
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trend for educating for the workplace has infected the humanities to such a 
degree that they “now seek to justify their value in terms of ‘embedded 
transferable skills’ of potential use to employers”.58 The purely functional 
aspect of education also impinges on the teaching of literacy and numeracy. 
The former Minister of Education, Kenneth Baker, said in 1986 that literacy is 
valuable only for the job market.
59
 In any case, analytical linguistic skills may 
be no longer adequate for today’s visual culture, so that Huxley’s advice to 
supplement reading with the new skills of looking and listening seems 
prophetic (“Audible Books” [11 June 1934], Hearst, 278). Finally non-verbal 
education has been totally neglected in formal education and physical 
education is often merely a once a week break from the classroom routine. 
But why should students not learn how to meditate or how to use their body 
correctly. Learning in a stimulating environment remains the domain of 
children with special needs and primary school children. 
On the whole, educational underachievement in deprived areas, inequality 
of opportunity via selection and the application of market principles to 
educational problems are but some aspects which allow for some disturbing 
parallels to be drawn between the provision of universal education in Britain 
in the nineteenth century, when parental consumers of education were 
sovereign, and today’s “parentocracy”. Marketisation, privatisation and choice 
have failed to provide answers to what most experts perceive to be a crisis in 
modern formal education in Britain. In light of these findings, it seems as if 
Huxley’s critiques of universal education still supply some useful reference 
points for a new approach to schooling, provided parents and the state alike 
put as high a premium on the emotional well-being of children and their 
precious curiosity about the world as on league table results. 
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